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We live today in an era of historical transition. The 20th century really
ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This heralded the end of the
Bipolar system of World public order that had dominated the post-World War
II era in its various phases. From the early, Stalinist, Cold War years of nuclear
confrontation, through the pragmatic accommodations of Peaceful Coexistence,
and on, finally, to an active East-West cooperation under the rubric of Ddtente.
The post-Cold War (more accurately, post-post-War) system of World
public order is harder to identify in terms of its political Grundnorm or basic
premises, to which all the legal ground rules ("rules of the game") must be
logically related. Bipolarity has disappeared now into history. Is it now a
Unipolar model of World public order, dominated by the single remaining
superpower, the United States; or is it, rather, a plural, multipolar system,
whether centered in the United Nations or operated, de facto, by a new
oligarchy of which the United States, the European Union (or Germany, at
least), Japan, China, Russia, and probably India too, must, by virtue of a
combination of military and economic and geopolitical factors, become the
principal players?
The patterns are not clear, and are frequently quite contradictory, and this
is to be expected in aperiod of fundamental and rapid change in international
society. The accidents of personality in political leadership, created by the
changing of the guard and generational replacement in the political 6lites, have
their impact today.
For the first time, the dominant political and also military dlite in all of the
main post-industrial societies is without direct, personal experience of World
War H or active military service under combat conditions. A good deal of the
"One World" idealism that, in reaction to World War II, inspired the creation
of the United Nations and its sophisticated institutions and processes for
resolution of international conflict, has gone. A form of atrophy was already
there during the Cold War period, as emerging Coexistence and then Ddtente
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produced special, bilateral, inter-bloc, international law-making. This was
achieved through Summit Meetings of the two bloc leaders, Soviet and
Western, and manifested in a whole series of Soviet-Western pragmatic,
empirical, step-by-step, problem-solving exercises, in nuclear and general
disarmament, security of territorial frontiers, control of international terrorism,
and related subjects.
The first post-Cold War election of a new United Nations SecretaryGeneral in 1991 and the choice in that election of the brilliant International
lawyer and reform-minded activist, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, seemed to presage
a post-Cold War return to the United Nations in its original, 1945, spirit of the
main arena for international law-making. But that promise was lost in the
emerging conflicts between the United Nations Secretary-General and the
United States State Department in which, in part at least, the political joinder
of issues involved major intellectual differences over the new, United Nationsbased, multipolar paradigm of World public order which Boutros-Ghali was
considered to be projecting. United States President George Bush, though
stressing United States primacy in any decisions on maintenance of international peace and security, had felt able, nevertheless, to operate easily enough
under the United Nations aegis, and he was able to obtain the necessary prior
United Nations legal authority, in the form of the United Nations Security
Council umbrella Resolutions, to support and legitimate the allied military
operations in the Gulf War crisis in 1990-1. His successor, President Clinton,
in contrast, in stated fear of a possible Veto in the Security Council by either
Russia or the People's Republic of China (though the matter was never tested
concretely), and putting aside the alternative law-making route through the
United Nations General Assembly on the Uniting-for-Peace precedent
successfully sponsored by then United States President Harry Truman and
United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the Korean War crisis in
1950, chose to by-pass the United Nations in the Kosovo situation.
President Clinton's decision on Kosovo was to operate, instead, through
the vestigial Cold War military alliance, North American Treaty Organization
(NATO). This left the combined North American-Western European military
action against the former Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) over Kosovo without
a positive law, International Law base. It is elementary that the NATO
organization could not hoist itself by its own bootstraps into legal powers that
it does not have under the United Nations Charter, or, a priori, outside the
Charter.
A legal dispensation from the United Nations Charter's absolute
prohibition on the use of force or from the Charter definition and limitation of
the collective self-defense exception under § 51 of the Charter, would have to
come from the United Nations Security Council or, failing, that, from the
United Nations General Assembly. A political and legal tidying-up of the
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Kosovo operation, such as it was, thus had to occur ex post facto: at the
political level, by bringing in the Russians and placating the Chinese (P.R.C.),
and leading on to the final, consensus settlement, at the legal level, by a United
Nations Security Council Resolution adopted on June 10, 1999, with the
support of Russia and with a Chinese abstention.
Would it not have been politically and legally wiser to have tried such a
multilateral approach, based on a multipolar consensus and within and through
the United Nations, from the very beginning? In the East Timor situation that
followed immediately afterwards, that was the approach that was adopted from
the outset: the Security Council was asked to approve armed intervention under
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, and by Resolution adopted by unanimous
vote of the Security Council, including all the Permanent Members, gave that
legal authorization on September 15, 1999.
The contradictions of an era of historical transition continue, in both
substantive-legal and also processual-legal terms. The project to establish an
International Criminal Court of universal jurisdiction was finally signed in
Rome in July 1998, but it was indicated that four at least of the five Permanent
Members of the United Nations Security Council would be unlikely to ratify it,
for fear of submitting their own nationals (civil and military) to any new
international criminal jurisdiction. Can the new International Criminal Court
have any real role without the effective working participation and cooperation
of the major powers? Meanwhile, the ad hoc United Nations War crimes
tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda continues, but with its mandate
apparently being interpreted so as not to extend to intervening states from
outside the region concerned. Will there be no legal opportunity, therefore, for
testing the relevance and applicability of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Convention of 1949, to the contemporary law of aerial bombardment
with particular relevance to civilians and civilian property?
As a municipal, national tribunal, the judicial committee of the British
House of Lords, has voted to remove the legal claims to Sovereign Immunity
against possible extradition to Spain to face charges of Crimes against
Humanity that had been advanced before it by Chilean ex-Head-of-State
General Pinochet. The legal initiative before the British tribunal falls wholly
within municipal national law and is based on the incorporation into British law
of International Law norms (here international treaty norms). It is paralleled by
populist participatory democracy action - in default of larger, diplomatic
progress on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including action by the five existing
members of the "Nuclear Club" to reduce their own nuclear weapons stockpiles) and in the face of the somewhat restrictive, no-clear-majority holding by
the International Court of Justice in the recent Advisory Opinion on the legality
of Nuclear Weapons, to spark the recent middle-power initiative for-a Land
Mines Treaty, banning the production and sale of these particular, vicious
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weapons of modem armed conflicts. Within ten months of its signing by a
record 121 countries, the Land Mines Treaty has been ratified by the minimum
number of forty states necessary for it to enter into legal force. But this has
been done without the United States and other Permanent Members of the
United Nations Security Council who feared a diminishing of their operational
military power under the treaty, and who thus lobbied, in some cases strenuously, against the measure.
The new confidence of non-Permanent Members of the Security Council
and particularly of those who, in the new international economics terms, may
realistically aspire to a recognition of their claims to superpower status and
those same new powers' disaffection with the failure of the World Community
to up-date and reform United Nations basic structures and processes so as to
take more account of contemporary realities in the World Community, may be
expected to produce increasing fractionalism within the United States led,
Western political-military alliance, and in turn, to encourage more local or
regional, direct democracy initiatives in new international law-making, of the
sort seen in the case of the General Pinochet extradition caper and the Land
Mines Treaty initiative.'
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